David Wu, Associate (吳戴文 / 投資經理)

David is an Associate mainly focused on investments. He previously lived in the US, but was drawn to the Greater Southeast Asia region by the growth opportunities and the wonderful people here. He spent the first five years of his career as a consultant at IBM, where he became intimately familiar with the enterprise software and services needs of Fortune 500 companies. Later, he focused on building predictive models and solving optimization problems for large companies, and gained an appreciation for the role of data and algorithms in our lives. He joined AppWorks in 2020 after receiving his MBA from Columbia Business School, and also has a B.S. in Mathematics from the Ohio State University. In his free time, he tries to stay active and is always looking for opportunities to hike or trek, often seeking the trail less traveled.

Hiring is a tricky thing no matter who you are and what the role is. But it’s doubly hard when you’re a startup founder and you’re making a key hiring decision in a new market you’re expanding to — you can’t afford to make any personnel mistakes this early on, especially when runway is limited and potential investors are gauging your execution on a promising new source of growth. And with advances in technology and globalization, the opportunity to enter another market has never been available so early, magnifying the importance of getting things right as a growing startup.

However, there are a few pitfalls that we as leaders and organizations succumb to at times, which can disproportionately impact hiring decisions in new markets. It’s good for leaders to be aware of these early on, well before you are ready to make such a hire, as it could take a bit of marinating to gain self-awareness. Here’s how people often go down the path of making the wrong hire:

Humans hate uncertainty… You’re expanding into a new market — a market that you’ve perhaps visited many times, whose people you’ve worked with and partnered with in the past, and on which you have done plenty of research. But let’s face it, if we’re being honest, when it comes to truly understanding the market, we can’t hold a candle to a native. And that’s totally okay! We can assess the uncertainty of the market, think of all the ways we might be wrong, all the ways we might fail, and all the ways we could hire the wrong people, and come up with a course of action which maximizes our expected return. Right?

You’re expanding into a new market — a market that you’ve perhaps visited many times, whose people you’ve worked with and partnered with in the past, and on which you have done plenty of research. But let’s face it, if we’re being honest, when it comes to truly understanding the market, we can’t hold a candle to a native. And that’s totally okay! We can assess the uncertainty of the market, think of all the ways we might be wrong, all the ways we might fail, and all the ways we could hire the wrong people, and come up with a course of action which maximizes our expected return. Right?

Unfortunately, that’s just not the way we are wired. Humans hate uncertainty. A 2016 study found that our stress levels were directly correlated to the uncertainty of the outcome, rather than the outcome itself. Not knowing how we’ll do on an exam is more stressful than being certain we’re going to fail. Receiving a call from your boss out of the blue is more stressful than knowing that she’s calling to fire you. And not knowing whether or not your startup will live is always more stressful than knowing it’s the end of the road.

So as humans, our instinct is to minimize this stress by suppressing the uncertainty. Despite the fact that external information is always incomplete and there are many types of uncertainties we have to deal with around hiring for a new market, in our mind we make things easy. We need to make ourselves feel in control. The kicker is that the same study found that our performance level increases with uncertainty. Feeling uncertain actually brings the best out of us, which makes quashing the uncertainty even worse.

…So we often latch on to our own organizational ideologies. Everyone has their own ideology based on what we have experienced in life. And when we are faced with key decisions to make, our ideology is what determines our decision. In the uncertainty of hiring for a new market, we suppress the stressful unknowns and default to something—anything to reduce the stress and give us some sense of control. So we default to our organizational ideology — it’s clean, easy, and certain. We hire the smartest person. And the smartest person, as we all know, is the one who most agrees with you — the one who conforms to your ideology the most. 

Ideologies come to dominate organizations. And why wouldn’t you hire the person who fits the most into your ideology? Everyone successful at the company is like that. That is because of the systematic entrenchment of ideologies in organizations — through mentoring, feedback given to employees and through the interview process. People who don’t agree with the ideology don’t get in the door, and those who do get in the door are constantly pushed to conform even more. At some point you can’t even imagine working with someone who doesn’t share the same general views. Why wouldn’t you hire the person who agrees with your ideology? After all, the company has been successful and the ideology has worked so far. With everyone on the same page, it decreases the need for bureaucratic control and increases efficiency. There’s just one problem.

The organizational ideology doesn’t always transfer to the new market. We don’t actually understand the local market that well. We don’t fully understand how it’s different from our home market, and that our ideology might not be 100% the best fit for our new market. As you’re interviewing candidates for key hires in the new market, they may express views about which users to target, how to market the product, and how to build the organization on the ground. Chances are, if the person is a native and the market is different from your home market, you will have some disagreements. This is normal and a product of you being an outsider and living in your ideology, so you should think twice before dismissing such a candidate as you would if you were hiring for your home market.

Joel Leong, founder of ShopBack (AW#13), APAC’s leading cashback rewards platform, now in active nine countries across the region, has often spoken to us about not just hiring a local person to lead the new market, but fully empowering them and giving them the leeway and resources to execute the plan that they have developed, as if they were a founder themself. Joel often moves to the new country himself for several months at the beginning of each market entry to fully grasp what’s happening on the ground, but always passes on the reins to the country manager after setting up the local team.  

We reach for control over local creative units. What’s even more dangerous is that we tend to feel most strongly about creative units like marketing and local product design. Many founders and organizational leaders are well-traveled global citizens who may have even studied and worked abroad. We may overestimate how well we actually understand the customer and how they respond to the product or the marketing. When local managers are telling you something that seems totally unintuitive given what you know about something subjective or creative, our first reaction will be to resist. This is in contrast to non-creative units like finance, IT, or production — boring stuff where local requests are usually approved without a second thought. Of course, the success of entering a new market often hinges on the creative aspects, so leaders should be mindful when hiring or evaluating local resources here.

CK Cheng, founder of AsiaYo (AW#12), the Series B travel booking platform which has raised $10 million to-date, shared a few experiences with me on this topic. At the outset of market expansion, AsiaYo used a centralized decision-making structure. “I made the decisions whenever I had a strong opinion, and I would take responsibility for them,” he says. 

But later, as they expanded deeper into Japan and Korea and now Southeast Asia, they shifted to a decentralized structure covering their large geographical footprint. Why? “I realized my hit rate was so low [making the correct decisions]” he laughs. “Now, it doesn’t matter if I feel strongly about something or not – I’m not the person on the ground. So I spend more time making sure that the decisionmaker has a good decision-making framework, and is connected to the right stakeholders in the organization, so that they don’t need to consult me.”

CK describes his current hiring approach in new markets as “trust over capability” – placing more emphasis on trusting the candidate over his own subjective evaluation of their capability. To increase this trust, he stresses finding people recommended within his close personal network – both his Japan and Korea country managers were second-degree connections. By hiring based on trust and track record, he doesn’t need to worry about being on the exact same page in terms of strategy and approach.

So what can we do?

I think the first step is just awareness — being aware that all people have certain tendencies that are ingrained in our psychology. And that sometimes it works for us, but other times we need to take a step back and be very conscious of our blind spots, such as when we enter a new market, whether that’s geographic or otherwise. This is not as simple as it sounds when you are a manager or running a company; making a wrong decision in a new market is a scary thought and can lead to major consequences. It is easy to acknowledge that everyone has blind spots, but only when one understands the root of our own personal management psychology can we truly make an informed, unbiased decision.

When you’re making the hire, you might consider giving a long look to that candidate who firmly disagrees with you on the approach but has a proven track record of success in the new market. This way, you’re conscious of your own pitfalls and can actually use it to your advantage, by finding someone who disagrees with you in certain respects. And you can have confidence and trust in their execution given their prior record. Feel and embrace the discomfort that will surely come with this decision which stems from natural human tendencies. Let go, trust, and empower. This takes tremendous mental discipline but could be a practical way to make better hiring decisions.

【We welcome all AI, Blockchain, NFT, or Southeast Asia founders to join AppWorks Accelerator】

Photo by Dylan Gillis on Unsplash

Sophie Chiu, Associate (邱敬媛 / 投資經理)

Sophie is an Associate in the investment team. Before joining AppWorks in 2020, Sophie had 10 years of experience covering public equities. She was part of the portfolio management team at Neuberger Berman, focusing on emerging market opportunities. Prior to that she served as a research analyst at Credit Suisse, JPMorgan, and London-based Autonomous Research. Sophie holds a Master of Finance with distinction from Warwick Business School and BS Finance from National Taiwan University. Her passion and expertise, however, extend far beyond just researching companies and industries. She is also an author of two published poetry books and holds a keen interest in human psychology and human behavior.

Whilst founders and early investors often regard an initial public offering (IPO) as an end goal, public market investors rather see it as the company’s first debut, akin to the NBA draft. With that said, there are some key qualities that the capital market looks for in a public company. In fact, there is already a standard of what is regarded as a ‘good IPO.’ I believe by understanding this, mid-to-late stage founder-CEOs can design a more structured roadmap for going public, or even rethink whether an IPO is actually the best option for their company. This piece of article is more written for growth stage founder-CEOs. However, if you’re an early-stage founder, I believe this article can also shed some light on what is ultimately valued the most in the sometimes arcane process of filing for an IPO. 

Trust is what helps companies earn long-term loves in the public market. It’s a playing field with big guys that have already proved their sustainability, building layers upon layers of trust as each quarter passes. Trust is cultivated not only through data (a result of management and operation), but also through market reaction. This means, executing a good or even strong IPO is indeed very important because the trust is then solidified from day one.

Three qualities: Growth, Size, and Momentum

From my 10 years of experience in both brokers and asset management firms, I see growth, size, and momentum the three qualities that overwhelmingly dictate the success of an IPO. Usually a banker would prepare a scorecard, rating a handful of factors that advise the parameters of a public offering. But, these three in particular have an outsized impact on a company’s debut, and understanding their underlying mechanics can help founders become more informed before they enter the negotiating room and differentiate true advice from sweet words. I will also introduce a few unfortunate case studies to help illustrate the importance of these factors. 

Growth

Growth, like in any fundraising process, is the most important factor. In the public market, growth expectations are not as high as in private, early-stage startups where 100% month-over-month is the norm. However, a 3-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 50-60% is still an ideal benchmark to strive towards, at least for a technology company. Consequently, timing of an IPO is a key consideration for startups; list while there are still strong growth prospects, otherwise poor market feedback is all but certain.

Candy Crush Saga, a staple among every grandma’s home screen, had gone through such pain. Its Irish parent company, King Digital Entertainment (delisted in 2016), first filed for an IPO in September 2013. Soon in December 2013, news about King’s consideration of delaying the IPO due to market concerns about the sustainable growth of the company had spread. Back then, Candy Crush Saga accounted for over 75% of King’s gross bookings and it has already reached 500 million downloads, topping the charts of the iTunes store. From the IPO filing, monthly unique players (MUPs) had already declined in the latest quarter by 6.5% , whilst gross bookings and revenues dropped 2-3%. This implied a negative signal for the growth expectations post IPO. The resulting impact on King’s stock price was evident, down 16% on the day of the IPO, with its valuation dropping US$ 2 billion (from US$ 7 billion) in the span of two months. Moreover, the follow-up financial reports confirmed the market’s concerns; King delivered a mere 20% in revenue growth in 2014, and subsequently declined 25% in 2015.

Size   

Size is a very important factor, but often overlooked by many startup founders; although, it may matter less if the growth rate is significant, say 80-100% year over year. Size encompasses both a company’s market cap and daily trading value and collectively determines the number of investors that can potentially participate. In Asia, the most ideal professional fund size is at least US$ 1-3 billion, which means an average position would be minimum US$ 20 million. This implies two things: (1) since most funds are not allowed to own more than 10% of the company, there’s an implied minimum market cap of US$ 200 million; and (2) even if a fund is willing to trade for 60 days (three months of working days) to buy enough shares, it means the daily trading value needs to be US$ 1.6 million at least (assuming a fund would not trade more than 20% of the amount to avoid affecting the price). However, the math here represents the bare minimum case. Most investors consider US$ 500-1,000 million as the bottom threshold for market cap, with anything below yielding very little appetite.

Many startups in Asia might face issues here. In Taiwan, it is a very common experience. For example, we have Kuo Brothers (8477 Taiwan), one of the main e-commerce players that was listed at a valuation of only US$ 30 million. This already implied a potential daily liquidity lower than US$ 1 million, greatly limiting the size of the potential investor pool. I was fortunate enough to chat with the chairman of Kuo Brothers Jerry Kuo and get his thoughts on this matter: “We certainly recognise the limit from our size, which actually leads to Kuo Brothers being greatly undervalued. However, coming to the public market still has its beauty, especially in talent recruiting and business expansion, at least for Kuo Brothers at the current stage. I believe in time the market will recognise our value as we grab more shares from this highly potential market in Taiwan.” 

Despite many Southeast Asian stock markets sharing similar features as Taiwan’s, founders in this region have long recognized the necessity to expand and reach a certain scale before even thinking about filing for a public offering. Sea Group’s 2017 IPO on the NYSE paved the way for Southeast Asian startups. It was the first unicorn from the region that went public at a valuation of over US$ 4 billion. Many other unicorn startups in excess of that size including Grab, Traveloka, and Gojek are now on deck.

Momentum

Momentum is the last but no less critical factor for a successful IPO. When I say momentum, I mean the market reaction in the first couple of days or months preceding a company’s first day of trading. Some may regard momentum as a function of trading or expectation management. I would define it as a reflection of a founder’s ability to deliver on their promise to the market. Momentum is generated only if a company achieves, if not exceeds  its forward-looking guidance. It is about execution. If there are any technical matters to take into consideration, at most I would suggest avoiding setting your listing window during major political or economic events such as elections or Fed meetings.

I would categorize momentum into three stages. These stages all matter, but it’s better if a company builds a strong momentum throughout, or at least exhibits a gradually recovering trend.

Stage 1: The IPO day – I would recommend that a company must never underestimate IPO day. It very often sets the tone of the market reaction. It is a direct reflection of the market’s appetite or view of the IPO pricing, and future growth potential. When deciding the IPO valuation, higher doesn’t necessarily always mean better; a valuation on the high end could lead to inflated expectations and therefore a higher probability of price correction on IPO day.

Stage 2: Before the first reporting – Investors tend to build some buffer in their model. They tend to apply some, if not a major discount to the guidance outlined in a company’s IPO prospectus. That is why expectations are rather mixed and vulnerable before the first reporting. Do not do anything that leads to further doubt. Again, it is about execution. A company should deliver what it has promised, signalling that the business is on track and in good hands. Any mistake (or misfortune) at this stage could instantly break investor trust, requiring an extensive amount of time and effort to rebuild it.

Stage 3: First reporting day – A company should deliver a good set of results that are in line with the guidance provided during the IPO process. The market reaction on the first reporting day will anchor a basic view on the company. If the reaction is strong, the company would have secured a solid level of trust among investors. On the other hand, a bad reaction would take extra effort and time to rebuild the company’s positioning in investors’ minds.

Snap’s IPO in 2017 is a great example here. Although Snap’s share price surged 44% on the first day of trading, the stock price soon lost momentum. Major reasons were related to the uncertainty of the IPO valuation, which was at 62x P/S ratio vs. Twitter’s 4x and Facebook’s 13x back then. Stock price fell 50% from the peak before the first reporting in the second quarter of 2017. However, the results made the situation worse. New installs of Snap dropped 21% year over year, comparatively worse than Instagram’s 8% year-over-year increase in the same period. Revenues and user growth also undershot, eliciting deep disappointment among investors and sending the price of its stock even lower. After this, Snap hovered at a low-price range for two years until they managed a comeback in 2019.   

Focus on your flywheel

Given the qualities discussed, I hope you now have a better idea of what exactly it means to be IPO-ready. My final piece of advice echoes popular sentiment among the most common early-stage pitfalls to avoid—premature scaling. Do not prematurely go into an IPO for the sole purpose of competing against the big guys.  We all agree that going IPO has its merits: It offers an exit for your early investors, and lets veteran employees realise the value of their ESOP and efforts. In the meantime,  the public market is indeed an effective and open place for (friendly) funding. However one should not ignore the fact that public market investors are not like the VCs and angels who spend years watching your company grow. Every inch of your ambition, vision, and execution are now under the eye of public scrutiny, where investor reactions tend to be immediate and widely irrational. So irrational, in fact, that an entirely new field of study has emerged called behavioral finance, where a handful of psychologists and economists have already been awarded Nobel Prizes. When expectations go sour, both valuation and liquidity (trading value) drain even faster. This vicious cycle can significantly impede the value and momentum of your business, taking years to build up again.

Therefore, I would highly recommend growth stage founders put a proper plan in place when considering an IPO. Make sure you have good growth, good size, and good execution and hence can deliver good initial momentum. Only then will you be in a position to reap the full benefits of the public market.

【We welcome all AI, Blockchain, NFT, or Southeast Asia founders to join AppWorks Accelerator】

Photo by Ahmad Ardity on Pixabay

Antony Lee, Communications Master (李欣岳 / 媒體公關總監)

負責媒體與社群溝通相關輔導。加入 AppWorks 前有 18 年媒體經驗，是台灣第一批主跑網路產業的記者，先後任職《數位時代》副總編輯、《Cheers 快樂工作人》資深主編、SmartM 網站總編輯。畢業於交大管科系，長期關注媒體產業變化，熱愛閱讀商業與科技趨勢、企業與人物故事，樂於與人交流分享，期許自己當個「Internet 傳教士」。

過去幾個月，NFT 熱潮瞬間吸引了極大的關注。幾乎每一週，都有主流媒體報導某位藝術家、藝人、球星、創業家的 NFT 商品賣出高價。在這些讓人目不暇給的新聞中，美聯社 (The Associated Press) 、《時代》雜誌 (Time)、《紐約時報》(The New York Times) 也快速推出 NFT 的應用，我覺得對媒體產業的意義更大，因為，這象徵了媒體產業即將進入 NFT 的新時代。

3 月 11 日，1846 年創立、今年已 174 歲的美聯社完成 (可能是) 新聞史上首顆 NFT 拍賣。美聯社為了紀念 2020 年拜登與川普的選戰，成為第一次在區塊鏈上鏈的美國大選，將投票結果製作成數位藝術作品「A View from Outer Space」，以 NFT 的方式開放競標，在這幅創作中，以外太空的視角，美國各州分別以藍色或紅色標示，代表著拜登或川普在各州勝出。最終以 100.9 顆以太幣成交，以當時幣價計算，約等於 18 萬美元。

3 月 22 日，1923 年創立，今年已 98 歲的《時代》雜誌，宣布以 NFT 型式拍賣過往三期的雜誌封面，分別是「上帝已死？」(1966 年 4 月發行)、「真相已死？」(2017 年 4 月發行) 、「法幣已死？」(2021 年 3 月發行)，最高拍賣價格為「真相已死？」的 88 顆以太幣，以當時幣價計算，約等於 13.8 萬美元。隨後，《時代》雜誌也陸續將多期對人類具有歷史意義的封面，以 NFT 型式拍賣，例如 「Amateur Photographer」(1953 年 11 月發行)、「Space Exploration」(1959 年 1 月發行)、「The Telephone Man」(1959 年 2 月)、「The Computer in Society」(1965 年 4 月發行) 等，分別象徵照相機、太空探索、電話、電腦走入人類世界。在概念上，類似以 NFT 發行前期雜誌的復刻版。

3 月 25 日，1851 年創刊，至今已 170 歲的《紐約時報》，專欄作家 Keven Roose 就將一篇網站文章〈在區塊鏈上買這篇專欄〉(Buy This Column on the Blockchain!)，以 NFT 型式進行 24 小時拍賣，他並在專欄中問道：「為什麼記者不能也加入 NFT 派對？」最終，這篇專欄的 NFT，以 350 顆以太幣結標，用當時幣價計算，約等於 56 萬美元，並將所得捐給《紐約時報》旗下擁有 110 年歷史的 Neediest Cases Fund 慈善基金，未來每一次轉手交易，這個基金可以再獲得 10% 的版稅 (Royalty)。

事實上，台灣媒體在 NFT 領域已有初步切入，並非一片空白。4 月 19 日，「台灣事實查核中心」的兩篇作品，被交易平台 FACTS-NFT 選為第一波推出的查核報告 NFT 收藏品，鼓勵大眾以 NFT 的方式支持查核組織運作，共同打擊假新聞。在第一個月，每則查核報告會以 0.05 顆以太幣交易，事實查核組織將獲得 86% 的交易價值，14% 是平台的服務費用，事實查核組織也能夠在每次的轉手交易中，抽取 10% 的費用。

媒體報導新科技、新應用、新商業模式並不稀奇。值得注意的，則是在全球擁有廣泛影響力的百年媒體，選擇在 NFT 發展初期，就積極下海測試水溫，啟動新商業模式的數位轉型，因為 NFT 正預示了另一個媒體新時代來臨。

儘管時空條件並不相同，但相較於 Internet 的發展歷史，NFT 走入人們生活，進入主流媒體的報導視野，所需的時間極短。Internet 技術的前身 ARPANET ，早在 1960 年代就已誕生，但直到冷戰結束後的 1990 年代，才進入商業化，在 1995 年劃時代網路股 Netscape 成功 IPO 後，Internet 才獲得主流財經媒體的關注和報導，還要再等 5 到 10 年甚至更久以後，媒體產業才進入內容數位化、網路原生內容、數位內容訂閱等數位轉型。以太坊上的 NFT 技術協定，在 2017 年 9 月被首度提出，2018 年 6 月才被確認成為業界標準，距今僅有 3 年。

人們閱讀、獲取資訊與觀點的需求不會消失，只會轉移。可以預期，除了傳統媒體擁抱 NFT 之外，未來 3 到 5 年，將有一波建立在 NFT 模式上的新媒體創業潮。一如在 Internet、Mobile Internet 帶來的典範轉移下，因使用、閱讀行為轉變，帶動各種數位原生、行動原生、社群原生、知識訂閱原生媒體的創業熱潮。 

NFT 是 Non-Fungible Token 的縮寫，中文翻譯是「非同質代幣」，也就是「同質代幣」(Fungible Token) 的對比。不管是紙鈔、硬幣，或是比特幣、以太幣，都屬同質代幣，每一個單位皆等值、相同，今天我借你十顆以太幣，下個月你再還我十顆，儘管是不同的十顆，但價值都一樣，借貸雙方都會接受；非同質代幣則每顆雖然近似，但卻並不盡然相同，某位明星球員的球員卡 NFT，編號第 1 號、第 88 號、第 5487 號就是不一樣。NFT 可應用在資產的數位擁有權證明。

正因為每個 NFT 都是獨一無二，所有交易紀錄和擁有證明都紀錄在區塊鏈上。所以 NFT 具備了收藏的價值，不論是文字、影片、音樂、插畫、數位藝術品等各種可以數位形式發行的商品，只要具備收藏價值，都有可能以 NFT 的形式發行。

相比廣告和訂閱，能為媒體帶來更大的營收

對於媒體創業者，乃至於整體產業來說，NFT 很可能是繼廣告模式、訂閱模式後，第三個重要的商業模式，重要性以及為媒體創造的營收，將超越前兩個商業模式。廣告、訂閱、NFT 模式，分別對應的是讀者、訂戶、粉絲三種媒體使用者的類型，用行銷漏斗來解釋，上層是讀者 (廣告模式)、中層是訂戶 (訂閱模式)、下層是粉絲 (NFT 模式)；用簡單的經濟學模型來解釋，在需求曲線之下，NFT 模式能為媒體創造最大面積的營收、其次是訂閱模式，廣告模式則最差。三個模式的營收潛力與其他特色，分別分析如下：

聚集讀者的廣告模式

從營收角度來說，廣告模式的成果最差。媒體需要靠特定主題聚集、吸睛一批免費閱讀的讀者，以此來賣廣告版位獲取營收，以流量為經營重點。但在資訊爆炸、人人注意力有限的情況下，要吸引讀者閱讀內容的難度越來越高，任何單一媒體要靠提升流量拉抬廣告業績，將越來越辛苦。此外，對媒體來說，數位廣告整體儘管仍在成長，但卻越來越難賺，大部分的廣告營收，都集中在少數科技巨頭身上，例如，2020 年美國的數位廣告市場，Google 與 Facebook 兩家就拿下 55.6% 的市佔率，而市場朝向科技巨頭傾斜的情況，短期內很難翻轉。

此外，以點擊數來衡量內容優劣，也降低了媒體願意投入時間、人力、金錢製作好內容的動機。為了追求流量，媒體只能選擇讀者最大公約數的主題和內容，最後結果，往往造成網路上到處都是類似的免費內容，而深度、優質、有影響力，但讀者基數相對較小的主題與內容，在這樣的模式下，則越來越難出現。

爭取訂戶的訂閱模式

相較廣告模式，訂閱模式的營收潛力較佳。訂閱模式的關鍵，在於媒體聚焦某個特定主題，長期持續產出品質穩定的內容，以贏得訂戶的信賴 (訂戶願意預付未來一年的費用，訂閱某個媒體的內容，代表訂戶相信未來一年內，能持續收到符合期待的內容)。雖然可因此創造比廣告模式更多營收，但一致的訂閱價格，代表與每一位訂戶的關係，等同於無差異的 Commodity，缺乏具體衡量每個內容價值的機制，有無法做到差異化訂價的限制。

此外，近年訂閱制興起，加速造成媒體產業 M 型化，擁有全球品牌形象的大媒體，或是具有特色利基的個人與微型媒體，是這個趨勢下的贏家。對絕大多數的媒體來說，要依據媒體屬性、閱讀行為等考量，在官網上建立起付費牆、訂閱機制，都是不小的技術門檻，再加上數位訂閱不受地理限制的特色，讓擁有全球性權威品牌形象的媒體，得以在訂閱模式中大幅勝出，根據 FIPP 與 CeleraOne 統計，全球目前達到 10 萬訂戶等級的媒體網站，共有 38 個，其中一半來自英語系媒體，例如《紐約時報》、《華盛頓郵報》、《華爾街日報》、《金融時報》、《經濟學人》等，皆是全球在各媒體領域的龍頭，另外一半，幾乎是各語系中的唯一代表，例如，中文或日文僅各有一家媒體網站。對於中型、區域級、侷限在單一國家的媒體，推廣訂閱制並不容易，很難在訂戶規模上獲得太大突破。

反而是一人或微型媒體，更有突破的機會，因為這類媒體的營運成本低，外部生態系的支援日趨成熟。根據 Antler 估計，在創作者經濟 (Creator Economy) 的生態系中，全球目前共有超過 220 個平台或技術開發商，例如電子報平台 Substack 等，提供各種服務與技術解決方案，讓創作者專心創作內容，直接帶動這幾年一人或微型媒體加速興起，例如英語電子報的 Stratechery (作者為居住在台灣的 Ben Thompson)，或是中文電子報的《科技島讀》(好可惜將在 6 月停刊)，都是一人媒體的代表，但在相關的科技與網路產業內，卻有不輸多數單一媒體的訂閱戶或影響力。

經營粉絲的 NFT 模式

和前兩個模式相比，NFT 模式的營收潛力最佳，因為它可彰顯每個內容不同的價值。在 NFT 模式下，營收來自粉絲的熱情支持，依據個人的喜好購買 NFT 商品，每一個 NFT 對每位粉絲來說，都有不同的價格，由價高者獲得。

衡量每個 NFT 的價值，技術並非主要考量，最重要的關鍵，在於發行者的 IP 或是 NFT 內所涵蓋的內容。好的內容來自有特殊的歷史意義、創新的表達方式、獨到的詮釋觀點與角度⋯⋯等各種面向，也因此，媒體用心製作的好內容，在 NFT 的模式下，將有更多元、更有效率的內容變現機會。

《連線》(Wired) 雜誌創辦人、科技趨勢思想家 Kevin Kelly 在 2008 年的經典文章「1,000 位鐵粉」(1,000 True Fans) 就預言：「成功的創作者，你不需要數百萬位客戶，你只需要 1,000 位鐵粉 (True Fans)，這些鐵粉，會購買任何你創造的商品。」

對媒體來說，NFT 模式則將 Kevin Kelly 的預言更進一步實現，因為鐵粉有更方便、更實質的支持方式。以我個人為例，從小就愛閱讀雜誌、大學編校刊，從第一份工作開始投入雜誌與媒體工作 18 年，至今仍收藏許多雜誌，例如 911 事件、Michael Jackson 過世、Steve Jobs 過世、歐巴馬首度當選美國總統、Facebook 用戶突破 10 億人⋯⋯等重要歷史事件，我都會選擇我最信任的雜誌品牌，購買能提供我最權威、最具歷史意義觀點的當期雜誌來收藏，甚至會購買收藏特殊期數的復刻版；在雜誌工作時，也經常會有企業、受訪者或是教學單位，希望授權報導的文字內容、照片、資訊圖表 (通常收不到什麼錢)。在 NFT 模式下，這些行為都變得更有意義與價值，媒體有更具體的變現與獲利方式，收藏者手中具有歷史意義、特殊價值的媒體內容，也有了更客觀與便利的鑑價和割愛交易方式。

對 NFT 長線發展樂觀看待的兩個原因

為什麼我對 NFT 對於媒體產業未來的發展如此樂觀？來自中期與長期共兩個原因。

中期的原因，是各種區塊鏈應用快速進化的特質。至今，建構在區塊鏈技術上的加密貨幣資產，曾一度突破 2.5 兆美元，儘管價格乖離、波動劇烈，但並無損區塊鏈、加密貨幣資產價值長期向上的趨勢，而受限各國防洗錢、監管等規範，加密貨幣兌換各國法幣仍有諸多限制，實務上仍有許多不便之處，等於將這些加密貨幣資產「鎖」在區塊鏈的平行時空中。

這也間接為區塊鏈技術，提供了完美的快速疊代條件。任何區塊鏈上的創新應用，都有可能在加密貨幣的世界中快速獲得市場反饋、進入商業化應用，就如同進化論一般，多數遺世獨立的小島上，會在極短的時間內，演化出十分多樣性的獨特物種，就像過去幾年，區塊鏈這座島上，不論是比特幣、ICO、智能合約、DeFi 或現在的 NFT，每隔幾個月就會橫空出世新商業模式吸引大眾目光，NFT 能在不到 3 年的時間，創造可觀的關注與影響力，就是證明，而 NFT 對於媒體產生的革命，也會比 Internet 來得更快、更具巔覆力。

另一個長期的原因，則是區塊鏈以及 NFT 對於經濟與社會將帶來更深遠的影響。過往 30 年來，人類社會共經歷兩波大型的數位化遷徙浪潮，第一波是 Internet，將各種實體世界的資訊數位化；第二波則是區塊鏈，正在將各種實體世界的價值數位化。

在 Internet 的典範轉移下，誕生了電子商務，從最初將既有的實體零售，移轉到網路上。隨後再逐步發展出電商平台、垂直電商、廣告導購、社群電商、直播電商、行動電商、OMO 虛實融合等原生的商業模式，並產生了 24 小時隨時可購物、4 小時就到貨這些全新的使用行為；在區塊鏈的典範轉移下，NFT 就像是每一個獨一無二的商品，都能在區塊鏈的世界中取得對應的價格，目前出現的應用或商業模式，都仍屬於向下相容、傳統模式轉型，對照過往電商的發展，都還在非常早期的發展階段，隨著產業生態系更成熟，會有更多原生的應用和商業模式誕生。

在媒體產業歷經廣告模式、訂閱模式的探索與商業化後，更不該錯過 NFT 模式。NFT 不僅不會和前兩個模式產生衝突 (媒體的廣告和訂閱模式，在擴大流量與內容聚焦上，有許多衝突之處)，需要砍掉重練才能切入，還能創造更大的營收來源，可用來招募更多優秀的記者、編輯、攝影、美術，製作更優質、更有意義、更值得被收藏的報導、照片、影片、資訊圖表等內容，而這些在 NFT 模式下，都是具有價值的內容資產。

這不僅適用於既有媒體的數位轉型，更有可能因此創造另一波新媒體創業熱潮，對數位轉型、經營挑戰皆不易的媒體產業來說，對於 NFT 帶來的難得契機，不僅不用妄自菲薄，更值得我們樂觀期待。

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